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NEGOTIATION, SETTLEMENT AND THE
CONTINGENT FEE
Robert H. Mnookin*
By imagining "what would happen" if the contingent fee were abol-
ished by statute, Professor Samuel Gross provides a fascinating per-
spective on a central feature of the American civil justice system.1 In
this brief Comment I offer four observations each inspired by Profes-
sor Gross's paper.
The first concerns the effects of fee arrangements on the settlement
process. In most tort litigation today, "single-shot" plaintiffs with con-
tingent fee lawyers face insured defendants whose lawyers are com-
pensated by the hour. To what extent would the balance of bargaining
power between plaintiffs and defendants be shifted in a world without
contingent fees where plaintiffs had litigation insurance and where fee
shifting with losers paying was the rule?
My second observation, also connected to the settlement process,
relates to the potential use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") in accident cases. In a world where the contingent fee was
banned, Professor Gross suggests there is little incentive for defend-
ants to participate in ADR.2 I explain why, in terms of today's institu-
tional arrangements, there would in fact appear to be powerful
incentives for the demand for ADR to increase in the years to come.
My third observation relates to Professor Gross's observation that
"it is uncommon for plaintiffs' attorneys to compete by varying the
terms of the contingent fee contracts that they offer."'3 If plaintiffs'
lawyers "rarely" compete in this way, in a market where there are
admittedly large numbers of lawyers, what alternate form does com-
petition take? With respect to the allocation of cases among plaintiffs'
lawyers, what are the effects?
* Samuel Williston Professor of Law Chair, Steering Committee, The Program on Negotia-
tion at Harvard Law School. An earlier version of this Comment was presented at the Third
Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social Policy, addressing Contingency Fee Financing
of Litigation in America, Chicago, Illinois, April 4-5, 1997.
1. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law... What Might Happen if Contingent Legal Fees
Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L REv. 321 (1998).
2. Id at 337.
3. Id.
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My final observation relates to the overall transaction costs of an
accident compensation system that largely depends not only on the
contingent fee, but also on what Professor Gross correctly character-
izes as a "highly complex, privatized, lawyer-dominated system of civil
litigation."4
I. BARGAINING POWER IN SETTLEMENT
Only a small percentage of lawsuits initiated by contingent fee law-
yers are ever tried. Instead, the overwhelming majority of accident
cases-certainly over ninety percent-are settled by negotiation, not
adjudication.5 This does not mean, however, that law and legal insti-
tutions are unimportant. To the contrary, I have suggested that par-
ties and their counsel bargain "in the shadow of the law' 6 where
expectations about possible court imposed outcomes, expected trans-
action costs, and attitudes towards risk all can influence decisionmak-
ing. Because I have long been interested in how law and legal
institutions affect out-of-court settlements, I find it interesting to com-
pare the incentives created by today's institutional arrangements with
those of an alternative that Professor Gross suggests might arise if the
contingent fee were abolished.
As many scholars point out, no single fee arrangement can perfectly
align the interests of the lawyer with the interests of the client in all
circumstances. This is a central teaching of literature on the "princi-
pal-agent" problem.7 What is striking about the fee arrangements that
4. Id. at 345.
5. Of all automobile insurance claims, the majority settle before any court filing, and most of
those suits that are brought to trial settle before any jury verdict. See Marc A. Franklin et al.,
Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1961); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27 (1983); see generally H. LAURENCE Ross, SETrLED OUT OF
COURT (1970) (discussing how the law on a day-to day basis revolves around settlement and not
trial); DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1983)
(reporting on a nationwide study of civil cases and discussing the frequency of litigation, costs
and lawyers' activities).
Settlement also occurs in some 80% or 90% of criminal matters in almost every American
jurisdiction in the form of "plea bargaining." See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 50 (1968); Galanter, supra, at 27.
Similarly, some 75% or more of all administrative proceedings end in agreements rather than
trials. GLEN 0. ROBINSON & ERNEST GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 523 (1974);
see Peter Woll, Informal Administrative Adjudication: Summary of Findings, 7 UCLA L. REV.
436, 437 (1960).
6. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
7. JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE
OF BUSINESS 1 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991).
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characterize accident cases today is the relative advantage enjoyed by
defendants. In most tort litigation today, a "single-shot" plaintiff is
represented by a contingent fee lawyer, while the defendant is typi-
cally represented by lawyers retained on an hourly basis by the de-
fendant's insurance company, which is a "repeat player."'8
Consider the incentive effects operating with respect to settlement,
first with respect to the lawyers and next with respect to the parties.
With a contingent fee, when the plaintiff's lawyer is considering a set-
tlement offer, that lawyer bears the entire cost of investing additional
time in a case, but she receives, as Professor Gross notes in his paper,
"only a third of the return" from her work.9 A defense lawyer paid on
an hourly basis faces an entirely different set of incentives. If discov-
ery is protracted and settlement comes late in the process, defense
counsel will be compensated for the additional time invested in the
case. I am not suggesting that counsel on either side are typically in-
different to the underlying interests of their clients or that counsel are
solely motivated by their own economic interests. Indeed, I believe
that both professional norms and concerns about reputation operate
to constrain opportunism, at least somewhat. Nonetheless, with re-
spect to settlement negotiations, other things being equal, existing fee
arrangements would seem to favor the defense in pre-trial bargaining.
The defense may also have a second advantage in the pre-trial bar-
gaining. With respect to settlement decisions, the plaintiff seeking
compensation is typically more risk averse than the insurance com-
pany which will be paying any judgment. Bargaining theory suggests
that, ceteris peribus, the more risk averse party is comparatively disad-
vantaged.10 In personal injury cases, the plaintiff is typically an indi-
vidual who has only one shot at recovery. Rational plaintiffs should
therefore be willing to accept less than the expected value of litigation
to avoid the risks of trial. Because an insurance company, on the
other hand, is a repeat player with a portfolio of cases over which it
can spread its risk, the defense can much more credibly claim risk
neutrality.
How would these bargaining power imbalances be affected in a
world where the contingent fee were replaced by litigation insurance
with fee shifting? Professor Gross suggests that in such a world plain-
tiffs would typically transfer their claims to a company that used its
8. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
9. Gross, supra note 1, at 335.
10. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 966, 969-71.
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own attorneys to pursue these cases.' Because the plaintiff would be
an institutional, repeat player with many claims, such a plaintiff (like
today's insurance company defendants) would tend to be risk neutral.
Moreover, in such a world both sides of the dispute would be repre-
sented by counsel who were either salaried or paid by the hour. It
would therefore seem that the net effect would be settlement negotia-
tions between two risk neutral parties, each represented by counsel
who are compensated in a way that creates symmetrical settlement
incentives.
II. THE USE OF ADR IN TORTS CASES
My second observation relates to the potential use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR") in accident cases. Professor Gross sug-
gests that in a world where the contingent fee is banned, little incen-
tive exists for defendants to participate in ADR.12 My purpose is not
to speculate about the use of ADR in a world where the contingent
fee is banned, but instead to offer a prediction about the use of
ADR-especially mediation-in our world where the use of contin-
gent fee arrangements is likely to continue unabated.
I predict that in the next few years (as in the recent past) mediation
will increasingly be used to facilitate the resolution of personal injury
cases. Why? My reasoning is straightforward. In accident cases the
settlement process is essentially controlled by the plaintiff's lawyer
and the defendant's insurance company. To the extent that mediation
can be shown to facilitate settlements that require a smaller invest-
ment of lawyer time, mediation serves the economic interests of both
the plaintiff's contingent fee lawyer and the defendant's insurance
company.
Other things being equal, a plaintiff's lawyer being paid on a contin-
gency basis would obviously prefer to have a case settled earlier with
fewer hours devoted to the litigation process. If I have a one-third
contingency, I much prefer an early $100,000 settlement after twenty-
five hours of my effort to a settlement for the same amount on the eve
of trial when I would have invested some 150 hours of effort. Plain-
tiffs' lawyers would surely be big fans of any mediation that can pro-
duce this result. On the other hand, a defense attorney being paid by
the hour may not share this preference, but the insurance company
footing the bill surely does. Insurance companies should therefore
press for any process that can produce equivalent results with lower
11. Gross, supra note 1, at 330-35.
12. Id. at 337.
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litigation costs. Thus, to the extent that mediation can deliver its
promise of helping litigants earlier in the process develop convergent
expectations about what the expected outcome in court would be, I
expect demand for such services will increase.
III. CASE SELECTION AND THE CONTINGENT FEE: How ARE
CASES ALLOCATED?
My third observation concerns competition among lawyers, and the
allocation of injury cases among contingent fee lawyers with different
levels of ability. Professor Gross observes that "it is uncommon for
plaintiffs' attorneys to compete by varying the terms of the contingent
fee contracts that they offer."' 13 For one schooled in conventional
micro-economics, this observation presents something of a puzzle. In
any major metropolitan area there is typically a large number of plain-
tiffs' lawyers with widely varying levels of skill. In a competitive mar-
ket-and surely the market for lawyers is competitive-why should an
experienced and highly skilled medical malpractice specialist typically
offer to represent a plaintiff with a contingent fee contract that is es-
sentially identical to that of a second or third-rate lawyer? On the
defense side, some litigators charge $125 per hour, others charge $450.
More skilled business lawyers typically charge higher hourly fees than
less skilled business lawyers.
In identifying this puzzle, my purpose is to highlight one conse-
quence, not to suggest the absence of a competitive market for the
services of plaintiffs' lawyers. Competition among plaintiffs' lawyers
does not usually take the form of offering to handle a case for a lower
percentage; instead, competition takes a different form in which po-
tential plaintiffs compete for the attention of more skilled lawyers. As
Herbert Kritzer has pointed out, plaintiffs' lawyers act as "gatekeep-
ers" who screen potential plaintiffs. 14 Those lawyers with reputations
for being highly skilled, experienced, and highly successful and conse-
quently whose opportunity costs are much greater, can afford to be
much more selective in deciding which cases to accept. If plaintiffs
were fully informed in a market where all lawyers are offering the
same contingent fee contract, a rational plaintiff would always prefer
to sign-on with a more skilled lawyer who (other things being equal) is
likely to recover more, by reason of talent and reputation. For exam-
ple, a potential plaintiff with a medical malpractice claim would obvi-
13. Id.
14. Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the American Civil Justice
System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997).
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ously rather be represented by Robert Clifford than by Robert
Mnookin, especially if we are both offering contingent fee contracts in
which the lawyer receives one-third of any recovery.
This analysis suggests that the queue of potential plaintiffs is typi-
cally longer outside the office of the most talented contingent fee law-
yers. As a consequence, I would predict that there is a reasonably
high correlation between the talent of a lawyer and the quality of her
average case. In other words, through a process that involves both
screening and referrals, top contingent fee lawyers end up with portfo-
lios of better cases.
If I am right that the better lawyers end up with stronger cases be-
cause they are able to select cases with higher expected recoveries for
a given investment of time, then it can be demonstrated that this has a
distorting effect with respect to allocation of resources. Economic ef-
ficiency would require that the better lawyers get those cases where at
the margin having a better lawyer will lead to a higher recovery. It can
be shown however, that in a market where all lawyers offer the same
contingent fee contract, a rational lawyer will be choosing cases on the
basis of that lawyer's expected recovery.
A simple example can illustrate my point. Suppose there are two
potential medical malpractice cases, one involving Able and the other
involving Baker, each of whom has suffered an injury. In Able's case,
liability is clear and the amount of damages is both substantial and
reasonably certain. As a consequence, the quality of the lawyering
does not much affect the expected recovery, provided the lawyer does
a competent job of preparing. In the hands of a highly skilled torts
lawyer, Able's case is expected to settle for $3 million, while in the
hands of an average lawyer the expected settlement is very nearly the
same-say $2.7 million. Baker's case, on the other hand, is more diffi-
cult. The establishment of liability requires a creative but sensible ex-
tension of existing legal doctrine and the proof of causality requires
marshaling scientific evidence in a sophisticated way. In the hands of
a talented specialist, the expected recovery is $2.4 million, while in the
hands of an average lawyer, the expected settlement is far less-only
$300,000.
Note that if the average lawyer and the highly skilled lawyer both
offer the same contingent contract, Able and Baker would each obvi-
ously prefer to be represented by the highly skilled lawyer. For each
plaintiff, the net recovery is higher with the more skilled lawyer. But
suppose the highly talented lawyer has time only to take one case and
must choose which plaintiff to represent? Which case will she choose,
assuming for the moment she expects each to take about the same
[Vol. 47:363
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amount of time to prepare? The answer is clear: the skilled lawyer
with a one-third contingency would prefer Able's case because the ex-
pected return to the lawyer is higher. For the same investment of
time, the lawyer's expected fee in Able's case is $1 million, which is
obviously more than the $900,000 fee expected in Baker's case. And
yet from the perspective of economic efficiency (i.e., the social point
of view) we would prefer that the more talented lawyer devote her
time to Baker's case because that lawyer's scarce talent creates much
more value and makes more of difference there.15
What this example shows is that one consequence of a contingent
fee system with standardized rates is that lawyers will compete for the
"best cases" and that the most talented lawyers will generally end up
with portfolios of cases where the expected return is highest. Ironi-
cally, the best lawyers probably get many high-stakes, "easy cases"
that hardly make the best use of their scarce talent. With hourly fees
or with contingent fees that vary substantially from lawyer to lawyer,
there would be less of a tendency for this to happen.
IV. TOTAL TRANSACTION COSTS
My closing observation is not offered as a criticism of the contingent
fee, but instead relates to the use of a lawyer-driven, individualized,
court-based system to transfer money to injured parties. As Professor
Gross observes, "[d]evising methods to reduce the overall costs ... of
obtaining compensation for injuries" is an important set of policy
objectives to consider in evaluating our present system.16 I am struck
by Professor Gross's observation that "[a]lmost no litigants can afford
to play . . . [the present-day civil litigation game] with their own
money;"'1 7 instead, defendants are financed "by liability insurance"
and plaintiffs are financed by "contingent fees-which in turn, are fi-
nanced by liability insurance."'1 8 As Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has
pointed out,19 and as the RAND studies demonstrate, 20 a striking
characteristic of the American system of tort-based accident compen-
15. Note that if Baker is rational and well informed, he would gladly pay the more gifted
lawyer much more than a third of the additional recovery she might be expected to create. Also
Able would prefer to hire the average lawyer on a 10% contingency. A puzzle that is worth
exploring both theoretically and empirically is why contingent fee contracts appear to be so
standardized.
16. Gross, supra note 1, at 323.
17. Id. at 345.
18. Id.
19. Jeffrey O'Connell, Early Offers as Contingent Fee Reform, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 417
(1998).
20. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES: RESEARCH
DESIGN AND METHODS 2-4 (1991).
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sation is that the transaction costs are extraordinarily high. For every
dollar transferred to an accident victim for compensation, roughly an-
other dollar is spent on legal fees. If viewed simply as a mechanism
for redistribution this system strikes me as nearly impossible to justify.
As Professor O'Connell 21 and Professor Stephen Sugarman 22 have
each argued, alternative mechanisms exist involving first-party insur-
ance that could transfer money to injured parties at much lower costs.
In my view, the fundamental debate, both in academia and state legis-
latures, should not concern the abolition of the contingent fee, but
instead should be focused much more broadly on the advantages and
disadvantages of more radical alternatives to a tort system: alterna-
tives that are not dependent for their administration on an individual-
ized, lawyer-dominated system of civil litigation for administration.
The critical question is an empirical one: Are the felicitous effects of
our present day tort system in deterring negligent conduct and defec-
tive products sufficiently substantial to justify a compensation mecha-
nism with high transaction costs?
21. Jeffrey O'Connell, Harnessing the Liability Lottery: Elective First Party No-Fault Insurance
Financed by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 697.
22. See STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPEN-
SATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 76-77 (1989).
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